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DAVID TRIPPETT
Skulls and Music
Fully fifty-five years after the doctrine of phre-
nology first emerged in Franz Joseph Gall’s
Vienna in 1796, the Halle-based writer and sing-
ing teacher Gustav Nauenburg confessed pub-
licly to having committed a “sin” by ignoring
it. He was writing on music’s behalf. As long as
the study of art is cultivated in isolation, he
proclaimed, it will remain “one-sided and defi-
cient.”1 Nauenberg’s writings were long famil-
iar to readers of the two major professional
music journals published in Leipzig, the Neue
Zeitschrift für Musik and the Allgemeine
musikalische Zeitung, but this was his first
and only statement about the pseudo-science
of cranial contours. His claim of having studied
phrenology “for some time and with the ut-
most impartiality” was a bold step in the arena
of professional music journalism.2 It effectively
announced his liberal views on the burning
issue of the day: “Since it is now a fateful
dictum to bring the arts and the sciences into a
reciprocal relationship and interdependence, we
can no longer ignore the irrefutable, fully proven
results of phrenology, for they are crucially im-
portant for artistic judgment and education.”3
Hyperbole aside, such a personal endorsement
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1“So lange die Kunstwissenschaft isolirt cultivirt wurde,
blieb sie einseitig und mangelhaft. . . .” Gustav Nauenburg,
“Die Phrenologie in ihrer Beziehung zur Tonkunst,” Neue
Zeitschrift für Musik 2 (10 January 1851): 13–16, here 13.
2“Ich habe mich seit längerer Zeit und möglichst
unbefangen auch dem Studium dieser Wissenschaft
hingegeben.” Ibid.
3“Ist es nun eine folgenreiche Maxime, die Künste und
Wissenschaften in eine gegenseitige Beziehung und
Wechselwirkung zu bringen, so dürfen wir auch die
unabweisbaren, vollkommen erwiesenen Ergebnisse der
Phrenologie nicht länger ignoriren, da sie für Kunstbeur-
theilung und Kunsterziehung von der entscheidensten
Wichtigkeit sind.” Ibid.
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of phrenology’s relevance to music is anoma-
lous; given the idealist leanings of many writ-
ers on music, its publication made the author
vulnerable to the standard accusations of deter-
minism, atheism, and materialism.
Although no less an authority than Hector
Berlioz had privately endorsed the materialist
leanings of Gall’s science, only a handful of
articles of this kind exist in nineteenth-cen-
tury professional music journals.4 London’s
Quarterly Musical Magazine and Review
alerted its readers to the science as early as
1826, as part of a drive to “introduce into our
speculations as much of various science as we
consistently can.”5 While the leading British
music journal, Musical World, effectively de-
clared itself against the enterprise by heading
each issue with an idealist epigraph from Plato’s
Phaedo (“music is something viewless and in-
corporeal, and all-gracious and a God-like
thing”), numerous phrenological journals car-
ried their own articles on music.6 Perhaps be-
cause of phrenology’s eventual status as a dis-
reputable pseudo-science, its historical impor-
tance to amateur music-making and musical
discourse has been overlooked. Questions about
why such articles stake a claim yet seemingly
fail to persuade, why an interest in composer’s
skulls persisted, and why advocates of the sci-
ence saw phrenological “knowledge” as an un-
tapped resource for enhancing music educa-
tion, all remain unasked.
Outside its historical dialogue with music,
the story of phrenology has been told widely
and often.7 Drawing on his observation of fam-
ily members, Gall first lectured on the topic in
Vienna from 1796, employing Johann Spurz-
heim as his full-time assistant in brain dissec-
tion from 1804. Following their separation in
1813, it was Spurzheim’s doctrine of individual
and social perfectibility that eventually became
popularized as phrenology. After Edinburgh,
London became a center for phrenological dis-
course. Spurzheim popularized the subject when
he began lecturing there in March 1814, set-
tling in 1825 after his lectures had been banned
in Paris, with one editor observing: “although
the science arose in Germany, it was subse-
quently almost forgotten there.”8 A series of
criticisms from leading academics only gave
impetus to the formation of phrenological soci-
eties in Edinburgh (1820) and London (1823).9
In the capital, George Combe was a chief advo-
cate and translated Spurzheim’s principal writ-
ings into English, while James Deville was
London’s leading practitioner, producing a stan-
dard plaster bust of the brain in 1824.
Broadly speaking, phrenological doctrine
equated mind with brain and saw the brain not
as a unitary organ but a composite of some
thirty organs, each of which was responsible
for a different intellectual or affective trait. Phre-
nology held that the brain’s form could be as-
certained by inspecting the contours and pro-
trusions of the cranium, and that the functions
of the several parts might be determined by
comparing their size with the power of the
corresponding mental faculties. “Every act of
the will, every flight of imagination, every glow
of affection, and every effort of the understand-
ing in this life,” Combe asserted in 1819, “is
performed by means of an apparatus of organs
4Berlioz asserts, “my ideas are becoming firmer and more
solid through studying the profound works of Locke,
Cabanis, Gall and others; not that they teach me anything
except technical details, because I generally find that I’ve
gone further than they have and that they don’t dare pur-
sue the consequences of their principles for fear of public
opinion”; Berlioz to Ferdinand Hiller, La Côte, 7 August
1832, in Selected Letters of Berlioz, ed. Hugh Macdonald,
trans. Roger Nichols (London: Faber, 1995), 99–100.
5Anon., “The Great Symphonists,” Quarterly Musical
Magazine and Review 8 (1826): 213–35, here 215.
6This epigraph appears in Greek and English on the front
page of each issue during 1839. It is taken from Phaedo,
§36, in which Socrates contrasts the divinity and immate-
riality of music with the mortality and materiality of its
instruments.
7See Stephen Tomlinson, Head Masters: Phrenology, Secu-
lar Education, and Nineteenth-Century Social Thought
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005); Marc
Renneville, Le Langage des cranes: histoire de la
phrénologie (Paris: Sanofi-Synthélabo, 2000); Samuel
Greenblatt, “Phrenology in the Science and Culture of the
19th Century,” Neurosurgery 37 (1995): 790–805; Gerfried
Kunz, Gustav von Struve und die Phrenologie in
Deutschland (Mainz: Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, 1993);
Roger Cooter, Phrenology in the British Isles (Metuchen,
NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989); and Cooter, The Cultural Mean-
ing of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization
of Consent in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
8Editorial, “Phrenology in Germany,” Phrenological Jour-
nal and Miscellany 4 (1826–27): 471.
9For an overview, see Stephen Tomlinson, Head Masters,
97ff.
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unknown to us through consciousness, but
which are capable of demonstration by experi-
ment and observation.”10 Such a theory was
attractive to Comtean positivists because it of-
fered a means of accessing the interiority and
recessed creativity of mental life, whose invis-
ible activity had hitherto frustrated a science
based on empirical observation.11
Perhaps because Nauenburg’s article aligned
him with a contested doctrine with few roots
in professional music journalism, it failed to
spark discussion in the Neue Zeitschrift. No
flicker of response followed. Yet there is noth-
ing enigmatic about his challenge to music peda-
gogues. After summarizing the tenets of phre-
nology, he predicted a closer cooperation be-
tween pedagogues and phrenologists, seeking
thereby to bring a theory of musical training in
line with the putative gains of this “science”:
Consider for a moment the normal educational path
of our young composers. They master an instru-
ment, study composition, instrumentation; in short,
they become familiar with musical technique and
then compose in all forms. The original organic pre-
disposition is more or less left out of consideration.
If by chance the young composer finds recognition
in a particular kind of composition—he will tenta-
tively continue with it; if not, the composer at some
point tries a different artistic tack; sadly, many an
aspiring composer reaches navigable water only af-
ter many failed and regrettable odysseys! Here the
empirical science of phrenology can become a safe
navigator in a great many cases. If the organs condi-
tioned by awe, piety, by benevolence and music are
large, for example, then compose religious music for
the time being. If the organ for love of children is
small, then avoid composing innocent children’s
songs; if the impulse towards combat and destruc-
tion are large, you would certainly succeed best in
heroic, martial music.12
The aims of musically applied phrenology ar-
ticulated so bluntly here can be seen refracted
in London and Paris several decades earlier.
The prospectus for the Phrenological Society in
Paris asks, “How should that science fail to be
of primary importance to a teacher, which
should enable him to turn the studies of his
pupils into the proper channel. . . . How many
tears would not be spared to childhood!”13 A
speculative article on symphonic composition
in the Quarterly Musical Magazine and Re-
view, cited above, inverts Nauenburg’s compo-
sitional training into post facto diagnosis by
mapping the musical characteristics of Haydn,
Mozart, and Beethoven onto postulated read-
ings of their crania by reference to their compo-
sitions. Drawing indirectly on the thirty-five
areas of the brain listed in Combe’s System of
Phrenology, shown in plate 1, the article exem-
plifies the transparently circular logic at the
heart of phrenological discourse:14
We assign Beethoven very large tune, ideality and
constructiveness, combativeness and destructiveness,
large also, with concentrativeness, secretiveness, self
esteem, firmness, and causality, somewhat more de-
veloped than in ordinary men—amativeness and ven-
eration would be comparatively small. These organs
will account for his invention and imagination, his
10George Combe, A System of Phrenology [1819], 3rd edn.
(Edinburgh: John Anderson, 1830), 9.
11Less persuasive, perhaps, were the far-fetched claims for
the benefits of phrenological knowledge: from relieving all
pain in childbirth to selecting the best partner for a happy
marriage; see Combe, The Constitution of Man: Consid-
ered in Relation to External Objects, 11th edn. (Boston:
Marsh, Capen, Lyon and Webb, 1841), 123, 155.
12“Betrachten wir einmal den gewöhnlichen Bildungsgang
unserer jungen Componisten. Sie erlernen ein Instrument,
studiren Compositionslehre, Instrumentirkunst, kurz sie
machen sich mit der musikalischen Technik vertraut und
componiren nun in allen Compositions-Gattungen herum.
Die ursprüngliche organische Anlage wird mehr oder
weniger unberücksichtigt gelassen. Findet nun der junge
Künstler zufällig in einer bestimmten Compositions-
Gattung Anerkennung, so wird vorläufig darin—
fortcomponirt; bleibt sie aus, so wird die Componisterei
einmal auf einen anderen Kunstgebiete probirt; leider
kommt manches hoffnungsreiche Kunsttalent erst nach
vielen erfolglosen und vergeblichen Irrfahrten in sein
eigentliches Fahrwasser! Hier kann in sehr vielen Fällen
die phrenologische Erfahrungswissenschaft ein sicherer Pi-
lot werden; sind z.B. die Organe der Ehrfurcht, Pietät, des
Wohlwollens und die Musik bedingenden Organe groß—
so componirt vorerst Kirchen- und religiöse Musik; ist das
Organ der Kinderliebe klein—so schreibt ja keine harmlose
Kinderlieder; sind Bekämpfungstrieb und Zerstörungstrieb
groß—so wird Euch sicherlich heroische kriegerische Musik
am besten gelingen.” Nauenburg, “Die Phrenologie in ihrer
Beziehung zur Tonkunst,” Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 2
(1851): 16.
13Various, “Prospectus of the Phrenological Society of
Paris,” Phrenological Journal and Miscellany 7 (1831–32):
297.
14Combe, A System of Phrenology (1819; 2nd edn. 1825)
front matter. Gall had listed twenty-seven areas of the
brain; Spurzheim had listed thirty-three.
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Plate 1: The frontispiece depicting the thirty-five areas of the brain listed in
George Combe’s System of Phrenology, 2nd edn. (1st edn. 1819; Edinburgh: J. Anderson, 1825).
Credit: National Library of Scotland.
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vehemence and originality, his contempt of author-
ity and determined adherence to his own rule of
propriety, as well as the general absence of breathing
tenderness that appertains to the other great musi-
cians.15
The spirit of amateur curiosity in such specula-
tion highlights what with hindsight appears to
be a startling lack of professional rigor, and the
musically trained editor cedes all authority by
inviting practicing phrenologists “to give the
public the benefit of [their] consideration of
these points,” later adding that since Beethoven
is still alive, “our conjectures” may be put to
the test.16
Phrenologists identified musical skill osten-
sibly with composition, specifically melodic
composition. Yet the “faculty of Tune,” situ-
ated just above the eyes by the temple, also
became a byword for musical talent in all its
manifestations. It was loosely defined by Combe
as “the sense of melody and harmony arising
from it.”17 A London periodical defined it more
closely as a sense of relative pitch: “perceiving
the pitch of the several sounds of the octave, in
relation to the key note of that octave, [which]
enables us to perceive the relationships of pitch
of the several successive sounds that form a
melody.”18 Spurzheim—who had no musical
training—took a broader view of the composite
brain. He distinguished the faculty of Tune
categorically from the sense of hearing and em-
phasized that musical ability depended on a
combination of faculties, particularly “time”
and “tune,” a view parroted by Combe, who
asserted their congenital status through the
view that even “deaf and dumb persons [i.e.,
those who have never heard musical sounds]
have an innate sentiment of measure and ca-
dence.”19 Linear melody had been the province
of genius and hence a quintessentially unteach-
able element in music theory at least since the
early eighteenth century.20 It is perhaps for this
reason that a material faculty of melody, de-
void of occultism and wrested from Nature
through its amenability to “exercise,” appealed
to the phrenologists. But equally, it is indica-
tive of the concept’s precariously strained am-
bitions that the Phrenological Journal declared
no faculty to have “been more puzzling to Phre-
nologists, or . . . the source of more disputes
between them and their adversaries.”21
Notable musicians exhibited extraordinary
local aptitudes that were already accepted as
part of their public personae and moral stature.
They thus became attractive examination sub-
jects—whether alive or dead—for a contested
science based in part on the identification of
aptitudes. Take the occasion of Franz Liszt’s
first tours to Paris and London in 1823–24.
Arriving in Paris with his father on 11 Decem-
ber 1823, Liszt was famously refused entry into
the Conservatoire because of his nationality.
But the celebrity arising from a rumored
Weihekuss from Beethoven, and his perfor-
mance at the Palais-Royal for the Duke of Or-
leans, drew Gall to seek him out. Two casts of
the boy’s head were taken “to be studied”: one
between 1824 and 1826 by Gall, and one some-
what later by Pierre Marie Dumoutier.22 Fur-
thermore, Liszt’s earliest biographies record that
he underwent a phrenological examination in
London during 1825 by James Deville (1777–
1846), a cofounder of the London Phrenological
15Editorial, “The Great Symphonists,” Quarterly Musical
Magazine and Review 8 (1826): 215–16.
16Ibid.
17George Combe, The Constitution of Man, 56.
18Anon., “Remarks on the Function of the Organ Named
Melody,” Phrenological Journal and Magazine of Moral
Science 11 (1837–38): 33–38, here 37.
19Combe, A System of Phrenology, 374.
20See Johann Mattheson’s attempt at codifying melodic
style as a function of harmony in Kern melodischer
Wissenschaft (Hamburg: Christian Herold, 1737). See also
my discussion of melodic theory in Wagner’s Melodies:
Aesthetics and Materialism in German Musical Identity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 69–129.
21Anon., “Music.—Madame Catalani, Madame Ronzi de
Begnis, Signor Ronzi de Begnis, and Mr Kalkbrenner,” Phre-
nological Journal and Miscellany 2 (1824–25): 120–21.
22See Marie Broussais, “Liszt. Dans les collections
anthropologiques du Musée de l’Homme,” L’Education
musicale 307, 309–10 (April, June–July 1984): 9–11, 29–31.
The meeting with Gall became a curiosity for his twenti-
eth-century biographers and still warrants a standard sen-
tence. See, for instance, Derek Watson, Liszt (London: Dent,
1989), 16; Alan Walker, Franz Liszt: The Virtuoso Years
(London: Faber, 1987), 100; and Sacheverell Sitwell, Liszt
(New York: Dover, 1967), 12.
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Society in 1823.23 At least two biographers, Jo-
seph d’Ortigue (1835) and Ludwig Rellstab
(1843), report that Deville was willfully de-
ceived about the fifteen-year-old Liszt, who was
initially presented as a “lazy boy, devoid of
natural talents, a boy whose family did not
know what to do with him” (d’Ortigue). Yet in
a dance of social credibility the cranial exami-
nation seemingly uncovered Liszt’s musical
gifts with an anointing ritual: “Deville touched
the boy’s head and said, then and there, strongly
affected, ‘Have you given him a chance with
music? That would certainly be my advice’”
(Rellstab).24
The extent to which there may be any truth
in this anecdote is less important than the fact
that both biographers deemed it of such inter-
est to readers that each dedicated a full para-
graph to it in relatively compressed accounts of
Liszt’s life. During the 1840s, moreover,
Schumann and others drew on the related sci-
ence of physiognomy to validate aggrandizing
comparisons between Liszt and Napoleon.25 In-
deed, Liszt continued to prove an attractive
subject: Michel-Arthur Castle devoted a mono-
graph to his character in relation to his cranial
topography,26 and Samuel Wells, editor of the
American Phrenological Journal, devoted an
article to his facial contours, using an engrav-
ing based on a carte de visite, and included his
stylized portrait in a selective pantheon of com-
posers for his 1866 book New Physiognomy
(see plate 2).27
Authority was a two-way street, in other
words: the subject being examined bestowed
authority on the scientific system, just as the
phrenological examination confirmed the apti-
tude of the subject. A large number of articles
convey the measurements and conclusions from
examinations of performers and singers, from
German octave virtuoso Friedrich Kalkbrenner
to Italian sopranos Angelica Catalani and
Giuseppina Ronzi de Begnis, speculating on the
combination of aptitudes each possessed. (This
treatment was invariably positive: I have not
found a case in which the science was used
publicly to diagnose a “bad” musician.) With
Liszt, d’Ortigue is most explicit: “Mr Deville
. . . was delighted to have found such
justification for the truth of his system.”28 In
other cases, though, the effect was reversed.
Combe’s reported failure to diagnose an opera
singer as “having large Tune” in 1825 laid him
open to ridicule and necessitated a public ex-
planation.29 Deville was similarly caught out
when examining the renowned Whig writer
Harriet Martineau and, left spluttering: “said it
was not fair,—desired to do it all over again,—
to come to our house and try, and so forth.”30
Public confirmation of “phrenological science”
was, it seems, forever retrospective.
Dead composers were no less in demand for
this reason. As is well known, Beethoven’s skull
was exhumed twice: in 1863 (along with
Schubert’s), for reinternment in new tombs;
and in 1888, for relocation to Vienna’s Zentral-
23James Deville’s two books make no reference to Liszt’s
examination: see Outlines of Phrenology, as an Accompa-
niment to the Phrenological Bust (London: J. De Ville,
1828); and Manual of Phrenology as an Accompaniment
to the Phrenological Bust (London: J. De Ville, 1835).
24“The First Biography: Joseph d’Ortigue on Franz Liszt at
Age Twenty-Three,” trans. Vincent Giroud, ed. Benjamin
Walton, in Franz Liszt and His World, ed. Christopher
Gibbs and Dana Gooley (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006), 314–15; “Ludwig Rellstab’s Biographical
Sketch of Liszt,” ed. and trans. Allan Keiler, ibid., 350.
25On this topic, see particularly Dana Gooley, The Vir-
tuoso Liszt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
87–94.
26Michel-Arthur Castle, Étude phrénologique sur le
caractère original et actuel de Mr. François Liszt (Milan:
Redaelli, 1847); for an overview of the interactions be-
tween Castle and Liszt, see also Pauline Pocknell, “Le
Liszt des phrènologues: ou Liszt, Castle, la Comptesse et
la Princesse,” in Ostinato rigore: Revue internationale
d’études musicales 18 (2002): 169–83.
27Samuel Wells, “Abbé Franz Liszt: The Confessor-Musi-
cian,” American Phrenological Journal 48 (September 1868):
88–91, here 88; see also Wells, New Physiognomy (New
York: Samuel R. Wells, 1870), 528–31, here 531.
28“The First Biography,” Liszt and His World, 315.
29A letter to the journal requested clarification about a
story circulating that Combe diagnosed a famous singer as
having very little “tune” faculty; Combe answered that he
merely measured the head of the musician and, in con-
trast to the musician’s own measurements, declared his
cranial tune faculty to be “not large.” He explained this by
stating that it was not the tune faculty alone but the
combination of time, tune, ideality, secretiveness,
concentrativeness, and imitation that made musical tal-
ent. See “Letter from Mr A____ D____ to Mr Combe,”
Phrenological Journal and Miscellany 3 (1825–26): 98–101.
30Harriet Martineau, Autobiography, ed. Maria Weston (Bos-
ton: James R. Osgood, 1877), 297.
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friedhof. Gerhard von Breuning, author of a
short essay on the reinternment, reflected that
in 1863 the skulls of Beethoven and Schubert
interested phrenologists because of their differ-
ence: “They seemed to reflect the characteris-
tics of the composers’ works. The walls of
Beethoven’s skull exhibit strong density and
thickness, whereas Schubert’s bones show femi-
nine delicateness.”31 In other words, the mate-
rial presence and empirical availability of the
Plate 2: Samuel Wells’s pantheon of composers, with Liszt at the bottom middle,
in New Physiognomy (New York: Fowler & Wells, 1866), p. 528.
Credit: Boston Medical Library, within the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine.
31Gerhard von Breuning, “Die Schädel Beethovens und
Schuberts,” Neue freie Presse (17 September 1886); Eng.
trans. Hannah Liebermann, Beethoven Journal 1–2 (2005):
59. It is indicative that Breuning’s statement faithfully
reproduces Schumann’s gendered reading of Beethoven and
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objects, as well as the medical training of the
observers, did little to distinguish Breuning’s
conclusions from the amateur speculations of
the Quarterly Musical Magazine and Review
back in 1826: both merely co-opted the puta-
tive science to validate existing judgments about
musical character.
Theft of, and unauthorized access to, com-
posers’ skulls is harder to document, of course,
but the evidence suggests notable skulls re-
mained an object of fascination. Schindler re-
ported to Ignaz Moscheles that the gravedigger
of Währing cemetery was approached with a
bribe of 1,000 florins to remove Beethoven’s
head before burial.32 And at least one account
in the Musical Times relates how Haydn’s skull
was stolen from his grave in 1809 by “two
students of Gall’s phrenology—the Esterhazy
secretary, Karl Rosenbaum, and Johan Nepomuk
Peter, the governor of the Lower Austrian pro-
vincial prison,” and that deliberations over the
object’s ownership continued as late as 1932
before its eventual restoration to his skeleton
in 1954.33
Even such isolated statements and anec-
dotes—devoid of the rigor desired of historical
evidence—may be taken as referring to a single
discursive object: mind-brain relations accessed
via musical aptitude, however indefinite its
horizon may be. They indicate a substratum of
ideas that defined a field of social and cultural
knowledge, a space in which amateur musi-
cians in particular were aware of scientific en-
deavor and responded to its potential. Aptitude
seemingly could be cultivated through special
knowledge; phrenology laid claim to the van-
guard of science. Hence the long established, if
mutable, concept of musical genius—whose
self-generated artworks mystified the process
of creative invention—became a site of particu-
lar tension, provoking deterministic theories of
music education and composition.
Pedagogy as Praxis:
Brain Size and Exercise
The efficiency of the blacksmith’s right arm and of
the philosopher’s brain depends upon the same law.34
The second edition of Spurzheim’s The Physi-
ognomical System (1815) situates education
within a broader cultural endeavor to “perfect
mankind”; but since all faculties of the mind
are innate, this perfecting can only take place
where faculties already exist in an individual:
“For education is nothing but exercise, cultiva-
tion and direction.” After accounting for the
contributing factors of nutrition and climate,
Spurzheim points to exercise as increasing or-
gan size: “This may certainly happen in the
brain as well as in the muscles.”35 In other
words, he allowed for the possibility of effect-
ing the development and growth of an organ by
exercise of its function. Pianists’ fingers com-
plicated this otherwise straightforward claim,
for they failed to change shape with practice.
This anomaly led Spurzheim to qualify that
increased aptitude in the absence of physical
growth also marks the effects of such educa-
tion, a caveat to which I will return.
The popular appeal of phrenological science
in Britain arguably relates to the close fit be-
tween its seemingly empirical route to self-
betterment, and the belief in self-help that
guided the behavior of Britain’s middle and
working classes within a laissez-faire economy
and a nonrevolutionary political regime. As Jan
Goldstein points out, Spurzheim and Combe
accentuated this aspect of phrenology for the
British public by adding to the roster of brain
organs “new ones that spoke to the value of
work discipline: ‘conscientiousness,’ ‘time,’ ‘or-
der,’ ‘concentrativeness.’”36 The goal of indi-
vidual and social perfectibility carried with it a
Schubert in his essay on the latter’s C-Major Symphony.
See Schumann, “Die 7te Symphonie von Franz Schubert,”
Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 21 (10 March 1840): 81–83.
32Anton Schindler to Ignaz Moscheles (4 April 1827), in
Letters to Beethoven and Other Correspondence: 1824–
1828, trans. and ed. Theodore Albrecht, 3 vols. (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1996), III, 214–17.
33Anon., “The Skull of Joseph Haydn,” Musical Times 73
(1932): 942–43, here 942.
34James Simpson, The Philosophy of Education, 2nd edn.
(Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1836), 91.
35Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System of Drs. Gall and
Spurzheim, 2nd edn. (London: Baldwin, Cradock & Joy,
1815), 552, 555.
36Jan Goldstein, “Bringing the Psyche into Scientific Fo-
cus,” The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 7: The Mod-
ern Social Sciences, ed. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy
Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 131–
53, here 151.
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moral imperative that interlocked with the civic
and aspirant, mercantile environment, encour-
aging objections about the scientific method to
be overlooked.
By contrast, the controversial view that
changes of mental function are always accom-
panied by material changes in the brain were
supported by prominent academic materialists:
“Is phrenology therefore true to its minutest
application? . . . I cannot but say, truly it is so,”
remarked Carl Vogt, Professor of Zoology in
Giessen and, later, Geneva.37 A corollary to
this view was that the areas of an individual’s
brain are congenital, hence remain fixed to a
certain extent; prominent negative traits could
not be removed, leading practitioners to advise
surveillance of such individuals.38 But the evi-
dence was contested. The objection voiced by
physiologist Johannes Müller, among others,
that local injuries to the brain appear not to
alter intellectual faculties (mapped phrenologi-
cally onto the injured regions) undermined any
assumptions that phrenology must lead to ma-
terialism. This view was later denounced as
“obviously false” by the century’s leading his-
torian of materialist philosophy, Friedrich
Lange, who by 1865 sought to distance his sub-
ject from the claims of this “crudest form” of
brain-mind theory.39
Materialist philosophies of mind were them-
selves controversial, not only because they ques-
tioned existing orthodoxy, but also because they
threatened the social order built upon it. By
reifying human endeavor within a universal
physiological condition they appeared to loosen
the moral and religious fabric of society, pro-
moting space for pantheistic and atheistic
thought, while asserting each individual’s in-
nate capacity for self-improvement and poten-
tial social advancement regardless of class, birth,
and social graces. For many, though, the premise
of equating mind with brain simply appeared
prima facie reductionist. “Is it,” asked the con-
servative Quarterly Review: “that there is no
other difference between a man and an oyster,
than that the one possesses bodily organs more
fully developed than the other; that all the emi-
nent powers . . . of reason, reflexion, imagina-
tion, and memory, the powers which distin-
guish a Milton, a Newton, and a Locke, are
merely the function of a few ounces of orga-
nized matter called the brain; and that, as soon
as this is dissolved, the being which possessed
those powers, perishes altogether!”40 This at-
tack on a prominent Fellow of the Royal Soci-
ety, William Lawrence, was occasioned by the
publication of his Natural History of Man (1819)
and his lectures for the Royal College of Sur-
geons (1816), both of which he was later forced
to withdraw when the Lord Chancellor declared
them blasphemous (annulling Lawrence’s copy-
right).41 While such publications were frequently
censored, they had long been accessible to the
wealthy and discreet, and, as James Secord ex-
plains, “were sold in much the same way (and
sometimes through the same channels) as por-
nography.”42
In 1790s London, the leading materialist,
whose ideas established a platform on which
later discourses on phrenology could appear
credible, was the polymath Erasmus Darwin.
His two-volume discourse on material and
medical science, Zoonomia (1796), defined men-
tal ideas as the motion of fibers in our sense
organs, and the patterns of these motions. In an
addendum he continued that the belief in ideas
as innately mental events, separate from every-
day nature, is nothing but a “fanciful hypoth-
esis, like the stories of ghosts and apparitions
which . . . amuse the credulous without any
foundation in nature.”43 Hence the immediate
objects of thought are simply the movements
of the relevant neural fibers, which underscore
a sensationalist epistemology in which mind
and body are wholly synonymous. Those who
37“Die Phrenologie ist also wahr, bis in die kleinste
Applikation hinein? . . . Ich kann nicht anders sagen, als:
Wahrlich, so ist’s. Es it wirklich so.” Carl Vogt, Bilder aus
dem Thierleben (J. Rütter: Frankfurt am Main, 1852), 445.
38See Cooter, Cultural Meaning of Popular Science, 78–79.
39Friedrich A. Lange, A History of Materialism and Criti-
cism of Its Present Importance, trans. E. C. Thomas, 3
vols. (London: Trubner, 1877–81), III, 118, 305.
40Editorial, “Abernethy, Lawrence, &c. on the Theories of
Life,” Quarterly Review 43 (July 1819): 2–34, here 14.
41William Lawrence, An Introduction to Comparative
Anatomy and Physiology (London: J. Callow, 1816).
42James A. Secord, Visions of Science: Books and Readers
at the Dawn of the Victorian Age (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2014), 187.
43Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or The Laws of Organic
Life, 2 vols. (London: J. Johnson, 1796), II, 643.
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would defend Darwin’s assertion were unable
to hold a professorship anywhere in Europe or
the United States, for state and religious au-
thorities assumed atheism, pantheism, and
materialism were “enemies of the status quo”
and sought “to crush” them, as Edward Reed
put it.44 Even the dissemination and publica-
tion of such ideas in most European countries
after 1815 became punishable by imprisonment.
Spurzheim explicitly maintained compatibil-
ity between phrenology and religious belief for
this reason. “A natural philosopher, who in-
quires into the laws of phenomena, cannot be
an atheist,” he implored in 1815: “he cannot
consider the admirable and wise concatenation
of all nature, the mutual relation between all
things, as destitute of a primitive cause. He is
obliged, according to the laws of thought, to
admit such a cause, a supreme understanding,
an all-wise Creator.”45 Here a plurality of
materialisms allowed that mind and brain could
follow the same laws without themselves be-
ing identical phenomena, and phrenologists
were adept at equivocating over this matter.
Given the later deterministic and materialist
principles—drawn from a spectrum of indi-
vidual formulations, from Cabanais to
Magendie, Vogt to Moleschott, Babbage to
Combe—that underpin phrenological discourse,
it may seem surprising that a majority of com-
mentators followed Spurzheim in viewing the
brain as physically mutable rather than forever
fixed in determining identity as a balance sheet
of aptitudes and deficiencies. This combina-
tion of the brain’s physiological innateness with
environmental plasticity caused a degree of con-
fusion within the British press.46 But, unlike
principles of atavism and degeneration applied
to aesthetics later in the century, phrenology
allowed for changes in inherited mental facul-
ties, and most believed that education could
and should be applied to increase positive traits
or strengthen a deficient faculty through guided
“exercise” (whose nature and supervision would
naturally fall to the phrenologist).
Perhaps the most direct statement on the
matter comes from Deville, the London-based
examiner of Liszt we met earlier. According to
a published lecture summary, he cautioned that
after neglecting to follow his advice to resist
language studies for between two and four years,
an eight-year-old boy he examined is, fifteen
years on, “now little better than an idiot,” and
that a promising mathematician, examined age
six, ignored advice not to overwork his “organ
of Number” and consequently suffered mental
weakness: “In his head [this organ] is now evi-
dently smaller than in casts taken at four and
six years of age.”47 Deville’s tales of success-
fully cultivating mental faculties stretch cre-
dulity further still, but illustrate both the coer-
cive moral imperative associated with phrenol-
ogy and the contemporary hope that such meth-
ods would lead to self-betterment, economic
prosperity, and social advantage.
It is also a measure of the authority of phre-
nological judgment that such stories could ap-
pear in a professional journal. To take one ex-
ample, Deville examined a nineteen-year-old
undergraduate’s head, revealed him to have po-
tential but declared him “too positive and self-
willed to go by the rules laid down for the
acquirement of knowledge, . . . [he has] less
knowledge at nineteen than he ought to have
possessed at twelve or fourteen.”48 Perhaps not
coincidentally, this matched his Cambridge
tutor’s verdict, and the student redoubled his
dedication to academic work. A second head
cast was taken two and a half years later show-
ing “a diminution of fully half an inch at Self-
Esteem and Firmness, and a large increase of all
the intellectual and moral organs.”49 In all cases,44Edward S. Reed, From Soul to Mind: The Emergence of
Psychology from Erasmus Darwin to William James (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 44.
45Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System, 491–92.
46See, for instance, the need for public clarification in 1825:
“That the mind can be altered materially by education, is
of course opposed to the opinion, that it is totally ‘depen-
dent on organization;’ but it is not opposed to the doc-
trine, that the organization of the brain is dependent on
the development of the faculties”; in “On Materialism,”
Phrenological Journal and Miscellany 2 (1824–25): 150–
51.
47Editorial summary of James Deville, “Account of a num-
ber of cases in which a change had been produced on the
form of the head by education and moral training,” Phre-
nological Journal 14 (1841): 32–38, here 33.
48Ibid., 35.
49Ibid.
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the maximum growth or shrinkage was half an
inch, aligning with Combe’s caveat about edu-
cation, namely that while organ size “deter-
mines power” and education increases the “en-
ergy” permitted by the size of a faculty, “size
[nevertheless] fixes a limit which education can-
not surpass.”50
London caricaturists readily satirized the en-
terprise. Plate 3, a sketch entitled “bumpology”
by George Cruikshank from 1826, shows De-
ville examining a young man while his mother
looks on and an assistant records the examina-
tion results: “Very large wit no. 32.” The image
also shows a note under the phrenological skull
on the table; it records a prominent murderer
John Thurtell as a “craniologically excellent
character,” mocking the hope that criminals
could be identified by head shape while simul-
taneously drawing attention to readers’ fear of
what may be revealed in plain sight. With ref-
erence to cranial enlargement, the frontispiece
of Cruikshank’s 1827 collection of phrenologi-
cal caricatures (plate 4) depicts three deformed
men, alive and interacting but with heads
marked with the divisions of phrenological or-
gans; each has a grotesquely misshapen cra-
nium, in effect warning of the potential to cul-
tivate abnormality through perverse science.
Deville’s enterprise also highlights the as-
sumption, unspoken if not unthought, that a
concept of the “normal” brain has crystallized
as the midpoint of potentially enhanced and
deficient faculties—neither too large nor too
small. The social concept is manifest in the
generic plaster bust Deville sold from 1824,
detailing the different brain organs and their
desired proportions. But it taps into a more
pernicious “power of normalization” that
Michel Foucault has identified with a network
of institutions in the early decades of the cen-
tury, wherein pathological conditions were iden-
tified by expert medico-legal opinion via a kind
of “scaled-down criminality for children [adopt-
ing] the language used by parents or by the
morality of children’s books.”51 Hence “self-
esteem” and “stubbornness / firmness” become
negative organs that children should avoid de-
veloping extensively. The solution, from such
expert opinion, was either expiatory or thera-
peutic; phrenology advised the latter, criminol-
ogy, the former.
Despite the ridicule, certain respected scien-
tists took the concept of brain mutation more
seriously. The Scottish physician William Gre-
gory declared such cases of changes in head
shape “a priori probable, on the physiological
principle that exercise has a tendency to en-
large an organ; and that now [after Deville’s
1841 lecture] we begin to possess actual evi-
dence that changes do take place.”52 As an un-
dergraduate, Charles Darwin privately sympa-
thized, seeing in the process evidence of free
will: “One is tempted to believe phrenologists
are right about habitual exercise of the mind
altering form of the head, and thus these quali-
ties become hereditary. When a man says I will
improve my powers of imagination, & does
so,—is not this free will[?]”53 In the case of
music, it seems that a critical mass (minimum
initial brain size) was needed, and the ratio of
size to activity was not always assumed to be
proportionate, a circumstance that Combe used
to justify enthusiastic musical practice in the
absence of increased musical skill.54 Here the
lack of talent finds its own casuistic explana-
tion through the science.
But to what extent do Deville’s lecture and
the chain of statements preceding it reflect a
consensus of opinion about music education in
Britain? To the extent that we can reconstitute
a system of nineteenth-century thought based
on discourse, the answer is: closely. Commen-
tators on British education were, almost with-
out exception, inclined to the view that cumu-
lative practice, iteration, and physical (sense-
50George Combe, Elements of Phrenology, 3rd edn. (Lon-
don and Edinburgh: Simpkin & Marshall, and John Ander-
son, 1828), 166.
51Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de
France 1974–75, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Pica-
dor, 2003), 26, 33.
52Deville, “Account of a number of cases,” 37.
53Charles Darwin, The M Notebook (1838): 30. See http://
darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=side&
itemID=CUL-DAR125.-&pageseq=1 [accessed 17 June
2014].
54“A certain degree of size must be possessed to render it
capable of increase. A lady whom [I] knew practiced music
for years, in the hope of improving her musical talent, but
at last gave up the attempt in despair.” Deville, “Account
of a number of cases,” 38.
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led, experience-based) activity were essential
for the cultivation of faculties. As we have
seen, this was a purely material process for
phrenologists. The abstraction of intellectual
potential through logic, theory, and specula-
tive metaphysics would cultivate little. “Speak
to a child of music,” Spurzheim had explained,
“but prevent him from hearing it, and never
permit him to play on any musical instrument—
can you imagine that his faculties of tune will
be exercised?”55 Ironically, against the materi-
alist leanings of this statement, Hegel, in his
critique of Kant, had voiced the same method-
ological plea within an idealist tradition: “We
ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with
the instrument before we undertake the work
for which it is to be employed. . . . But the
55Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System, 555.
Plate 3: George Cruikshank caricature of phrenology. Etching, 24 February 1826.
Credit: British Museum, 1859, 0316.188.
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examination of knowledge can only be carried
out by an act of knowledge. To examine this
so-called instrument is the same thing as to
know it. But to seek to know before we know
is as absurd as the wise resolution of
Scholasticus, not to venture into the water un-
til he had learned to swim.”56 That this ful-
crum applies equally to metaphysics, material-
ist phrenology, and music pedagogy suggests
the degree to which commentators in each tra-
dition confronted ideas from the same discourse.
This speaks less to an order of generality than
one of resemblance, for access to musical as
well as, say, anatomical knowledge, depended
on haptic activity and the cognitive challenges
of manual work. Even idealist metaphysics, for
Hegel, deals in knowledge as a fluid substance
that philosophers manipulate. Prior to an his-
torical separation of thinking from doing (with
the assembly line),57 musicians, surgeons, and
certain idealists thus resembled each other in
their material dependence on objects of knowl-
edge. Amid differing qualities of adherence to
materialism, this regime coexisted comfortably
with phrenology where the dominant social
ethos of self-betterment (or “mental improve-
ment” as it was usually called) was rational-
ized in terms of repeated exercise of function
concerning those objects, and tangible brain
growth.
Officially, the national discourse on educa-
tional method remained detached from phre-
nology, but continuities between them were
nevertheless present. Often educationists were
themselves prominent phrenologists. This was
the case with the Scottish lawyer James
56G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, from the Encyclo-
paedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William
Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), §10, 17.
57For a discussion of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s influence
over work in which “all possible brain work [is] removed
from the shop and centered in the planning or laying-out
department,” see Matthew B. Crawford, Shop Class as
Soul Craft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work (New York:
Penguin, 2009), 38ff.
Plate 4: George Cruikshank, frontispiece to Phrenological Illustrations, or
An Artist’s View of the Cranological System of Doctors Gall and Spurheim (London, 1827).
Credit: British Museum, 1978, U.3020.1.
112
19TH
CENTURY
MUSIC
Simpson (1781–1853), who lectured in England
on educational matters that included
Lancastrian education and the monitor system
throughout the 1830s and 40s, appearing as a
witness for seven consecutive days in 1837 be-
fore the House of Commons committee on na-
tional education in Ireland.58 The previous year,
his 288-page book on education had applied
phrenological principles to children’s education
in all but name:
To be improved each and every faculty must be
positively exercised. Perceptive instruction is noto-
riously insufficient to give mechanical skill . . . [the
observing and reflective faculties] must themselves
work in a long course of active practice, to reap the
reward of talent. . . . The law of exercise is of univer-
sal application. It is a fundamental law of nature,
that all the capacities of man are enlarged and
strengthened by being used. From the energy of a
muscle, up to the highest faculty intellectual and
moral, repeated exercise of the function increases its
intensity. The efficiency of the blacksmith’s right
arm and of the philosopher’s brain depends upon the
same law. The bodily force, the senses, the observ-
ing and reasoning faculties, the moral feelings, can
only be improved by habitual exercise.59
It is striking in this context that the Viennese
music pedagogue Carl Czerny explains the pur-
pose of his composition treatise, op. 600, as the
practical application of a priori knowledge; be-
fore studying models of form and embarking on
exercises, students “are supposed to possess an
entire theoretical knowledge of composition,
namely of harmony, counterpoint, the correct
conduct of the parts, &c.; and therefore noth-
ing need be said here on these subjects.”60 The
goal is skillful activity (delineating form) rather
than new knowledge; the latter, uncultivated
through activity and exercise, appears of little
value for a practical school, or what Hindemith
a century later would call compositional craft.
While composition treatises have prescribed
progressive “exercises” at least since J. J. Fux’s
Gradus ad Parnassum (1725), the oblique ap-
plication to musical studies of a materialist
work ethic acting on “brain fibres” and finger
dexterity, akin to physical exercise working on
muscle fibers and sinews, is new to the early
nineteenth century and its advocacy of sensory
epistemology, of knowledge through physical
experience.61
Czerny was a teenage teacher of piano and
composition in Vienna when Gall’s public lec-
tures first drew attention to his theory of the
brain and mental faculties. By 1802, when
Czerny turned eleven, phrenology had gained
such currency that the French philosopher
Charles Villers could ask: “who hasn’t heard of
Gall and his skulls?”62 As well as circulating
within the city’s culture, Czerny had access to
Gall’s new science through his most important
professional relationship: Beethoven’s Tagebuch
(1812–18) records the composer’s acquaintance
with Gall’s doctrine in a comment about his
nephew Karl.63 In the absence of concrete evi-
dence, we can only speculate as to whether
Czerny encountered materialist ideas about “ex-
ercise” in the context of phrenology, but it
would seem his attitude toward mental and
muscular repetition is worth examining in this
context. Not least because his first piano
method (Hundert Übungsstücke, op. 139) ap-
peared in 1827 at precisely the time Spurzheim
clarified the importance of exercises and of
praxis for all educational reforms:
I employ the word exercise as synonymous with
putting into action. Now the first law of this kind is,
58See Edward Irving Carlyle, “Simpson, James,” Dictio-
nary of National Biography, 63 vols. (London: Smith &
Elder, 1885–1900), vol. 52, 270.
59James Simpson, The Philosophy of Education (Edinburgh:
Adam & Charles Black, 1836), 91. Simpson collaborated
with George Combe in establishing the Phrenological Jour-
nal (1823–47), to which he also contributed.
60Carl Czerny, School of Practical Composition: or, Com-
plete Treatise on the Composition of all Kinds of Music,
Op. 600, trans. John Bishop (London: Cocks, 1848), iii.
61For arguments relating Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein to
“bodies” of musical knowledge, see Leslie David Blasius,
“The Mechanics of Sensations and the Construction of
the Romantic Musical Experience,” Music Theory in the
Age of Romanticism, ed. Ian Bent (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 3–24, esp. 17–18.
62Charles Villers, Lettre à George Cuvier, de L’Institut
National de France, sur une Nouvelle Theorie du Cerveau,
par le Docteur Gall (Metz: Colligon, 1802), 34.
63“Gall observes that a cold bath is not beneficial to the
growing body: he even recommends that one should not
allow young people between the ages of 14 and 21 to take
cold baths, but only when the body is fully grown.” See
Maynard Solomon, “Beethoven’s Tagebuch of 1812–18,”
Beethoven Studies 3, ed. Alan Tyson (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1982), 193–285, here 270.
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that exercise strengthens powers. . . . Each mental
power, if it be sufficiently cultivated, grows more
energetic, whilst, if neglected, it shows less activity.
. . . It is time to abandon the immense error, that words
and precepts are sufficient to call internal feelings and
intellectual faculties into active exercise.64
By comparison with Vienna’s musical envi-
rons, Czerny “prescribed to piano players ‘la-
bor’ [Arbeit] on their instrument,” Grete
Wehmeyer argues, “at a time in Europe when
activity and labor were declared to be the high-
est values for bourgeois life.”65 The tutor advo-
cated working through daily exercises, in com-
position as well as in keyboard dexterity, as the
only guarantee of success. This applied to both
professionals and amateurs.66 If exercises in key-
board technique and composition are not di-
rectly comparable, the implication of a com-
mon epistemology nevertheless emerges: that
both are rooted in the cognitive experience of
sensation.67 Speaking of piano methods by J. N.
Hummel and Louis Adam, Leslie Blasius has
explicitly identified finger training with com-
positional theory in this sense: “The student
learns this simple theory by association with
the sensation of the hands. In fact the student
learns more. The progression through the text,
through the accompanying didactic etudes,
through other studies, through excerpts, is a
way of rationally increasing the quality and
complexity of sensations and associations, of
creating a rich and replete musical experi-
ence.”68 This theory operates within a liminal
space between organic and mechanic, where
hands were figured as both natural organs and
artificially trained instruments. Equally, like
the “natural law” Spurzheim saw between the
mutable shape of the brain and the mutable
cranium,69 mutable genres and musical forms,
for Czerny, also “depend . . . on natural laws.”70
Together these position both humans and their
art as products of nature, and it is for this
reason that Spurzheim concluded his comments
on education thus: “those who endeavour to
educate men ought to begin by studying the
nature of man.”71
Pursuing this theory of equivalence, several
writers find in the hands of pianists a musical
analogue to the phrenological mind (i.e., an
aggregate of mutable organs existing both inde-
pendently and as a composite). As noted above,
Spurzheim used this to qualify the assumption
of a proportional ratio between mental exercise
and physical size of individual faculties: “The
fingers of an individual, habituated to play upon
the pianoforte, do not always increase [in size],
but their motions become more facile and less
easily fatigued, than in a person who seldom
makes use of his hands.”72 By the early nine-
teenth century, virtuoso hands had become an
object of fetishistic interest, as the mediator
between mind and instrument, or the “instru-
ment of instruments” as James Q. Davies puts
it in his cultural study of virtuoso physiolo-
gies.73
Aestheticization of their physical appearance
64Spurzheim, View of the Elementary Principles of Educa-
tion [1821], 2nd edn. (London: Treuttel, Würtz, and Rich-
ter, 1828), 96–97, 103.
65“Czerny verordnete den Klavierspielern ‘Arbeit‘ (Piano-
forte-Schule, vol. 3) am Instrument in einer Zeit, als in
Europa für das bürgerliche Leben Tätigkeit und Arbeit zu
den höchsten Werten erklärt . . . wurden”; Grete
Wehmeyer, “Carl Czerny” Die Musik in Geschichte und
Gegenwart, 2nd edn. (Kassel: Barenreiter, 2001), col. 229.
66Just as Adam Liszt assured his son’s former teacher in
1824 that “I still have [Franz] practice scales and etudes
with a metronome and do not deviate from your prin-
ciples” (“Ich lasse ihn noch immer Scala und Etuden beim
Metronome spielen und gehe nicht ab von Ihren
Principien”), Czerny explained in his 1837 Letters to a
Young Lady: “I therefore most earnestly recommend you
to practice daily, with untiring diligence and the greatest
attention, all the five-finger exercises in both hands, which
you will find at the beginning of my Pianoforte School.”
See Adam Liszt to Czerny (29 July 1824), cited in La Mara,
Classisches und Romantisches aus der Tonwelt (Leipzig:
Breitkopf & Härtel, 1892), 249; and Carl Czerny, Letters to
a Young Lady on the Art of Playing the Pianoforte, trans.
J. A. Hamilton (London: Cocks, 1837), 8–9. For an assess-
ment of Czerny’s role as Liszt’s tutor, see James Deaville,
“A Star Is Born? Czerny, Liszt, and the Pedagogy of Virtu-
osity,” in Beyond the Art of Finger Dexterity: Reassessing
Carl Czerny, ed. David Gramit (Rochester: University of
Rochester Press, 2008), 52–66.
67See Grete Wehmeyer’s characterization of Czerny’s atti-
tude to pedagogy as “industrial work ideology” in Carl
Czerny und die Einzelhaft am Klavier (Kassel: Bärenreiter,
1983), 153ff.
68Blasius, “The Mechanics of Sensation,” 13.
69Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System, 224.
70Czerny, School of Practical Composition, 2.
71Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System, 558.
72Ibid., 555.
73James Q. Davies, Romantic Anatomies of Performance
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 102.
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meant aestheticization of their mediating physi-
cality, prompting a culture of reading physique
in light of something else. “At the threshold of
experience,” Davies continues (citing Aristotle’s
proposition that “the soul is as the hand”),
“hands wove inner and outer together. . . . This
hand was a sign, and it acted in signs. The
work it performed, the language it spoke, its
very physiognomy was always ‘engaged to’ or
‘on behalf of.’”74 Phrenologists co-opting the
same discourse did so with the aim of using the
hand as a material cipher for the brain. Writing
with greater professional expertise than
Spurzheim, Nauenburg offered a more nuanced
simile to explain mental development, draw-
ing music and phrenology further into a single
discursive field:
I imagine the activity of individual organs of the
brain to be like that of muscles in the hand. The
muscles of each finger are naturally stronger or
weaker; in some usage the natural muscle strength
is never fully developed; in others only individual
fingers are used; the natural aptitude for cultivation
of strength resides equally in the fingers used less,
but it exists and is not at all dead. The pianist
nevertheless strives for harmonious training of ev-
ery finger; the muscle power of individual fingers
operates separately and as a unity according to natu-
ral laws and any desired use. So it is with the organs
of the brain; those that are by nature the largest and
strongest lead sooner or later to one’s most notice-
able outward characteristics and determine one’s
areas of effectiveness in life. The weak and (rela-
tively) small organs tend to remain behind in their
development and become barely or not at all notice-
able in one’s outer life; hence their purely physical
activity, their animal life, so to speak, in no way
dies out.75
Beyond the basic simile, the pianist’s naturally
unbalanced hand becomes a paradigm for the
interdependence of education and inherited
“animal” condition. It is this interdependence
that determines an individual’s mental and
physical faculties; but while young pianists
aimed for evenness across the fingers in scales
and passagework, it is not clear that any phre-
nologists advocated a normalizing agenda across
faculties. Notable improviser virtuosos such as
Kalkbrenner and Liszt voluntarily submitted
themselves for cranial examination, and
Nauenburg’s strategy was doubtless to capture
readers’ imaginations through their hands.76
Logier, Lancaster, and
the Monitorial System
As the case of Czerny suggests, the extent to
which such conjecture overlapped with theo-
ries of musical training becomes more concrete
through an emphasis on practical exercises and
systematic, graduated learning dictated by pub-
lished tutors. There were no music pedagogical
institutions in London when Spurzheim began
lecturing, so phrenological ideas must be traced
at the level of individual tutors. When the Royal
Academy of Music opened in 1822, it listed
three professors of “composition and harmony”:
Thomas Attwood, William Crotch, and Will-
iam Shield. Two had published treatises pri-
vately (Crotch’s Elements of Musical Compo-
sition [1812]; Shield’s Rudiments of
Thoroughbass for Young Harmonists [1815]),
while the major German and French treatises
appeared in translation only during the 1840s
and 50s (see Table 1). In light of Spurzheim’s
definition of education as “exercise, cultiva-
tion, and direction,” it is telling that Crotch’s
1812 treatise interleaves a series of practical74Ibid.
75“Ich stelle mir die Thätigkeit der einselnen Seelenorgane
so vor, wie die Thätigkeit der Muskeln in der Hand; die
Muskeln einzelner Finger sind von Natur kräftiger oder
schwächer; bei manchen Handbeschäftigungen kommen
die natürlichen Muskelkräfte niemals zur vollständigen
Entwicklung; bei manchen werden nur einzelne Finger
gebraucht; die natürliche Anlage zur Kraftentwicklung ruht
gleichsam in den weniger gebrauchten Fingern, sie ist aber
vorhanden und keineswegs abgestorben. Der Pianoforte-
spieler jedoch restrebt eine harmonische Ausbildung aller
Finger; die Muskelkraft in den einzelnen Fingern wirkt
gesondert und vereinigt nach natürlichen Gesetzen und
zu beliebigem Gebrauche. Aehnlich die Seelenorgane; die
von Natur größten und kräftigsten kommen früher oder
später zur äußeren Lebensthätigkeit und bestimmen die
Lebenswirksamkeit des Menschen; die schwachen und
(relativ) kleinen Organe bleiben in der Regel in ihrer
Entwickelung zurück und werden im äußeren Leben des
Menschen wenig oder night bemerkbar; ihre rein physische
Thätigkeit, ihr, so zu sagen, thierisches Leben stirbt deshalb
keineswegs ab.” Nauenburg, “Die Phrenologie in ihrer
Beziehung zur Tonkunst,” Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 2
(1851): 16.
76See “Music—Madame Catalani, Madame Ronzi de Begnis,
Signor Ronzi de Begnis, and Mr Kalkbrenner,” Phrenologi-
cal Journal and Miscellany 2 (1824–25): 120–30, here 127–
30.
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“tasks” for students to complete in order to
inculcate through activity the knowledge gained
after reading outlines of harmonic grammar and
form.77 Czerny’s composition treatise, op. 600,
published several decades after his systematic
keyboard exercises, adopts a similar approach
in its emphasis: “practically employing . . .
theoretical knowledge.”78 Each volume bears
the subtitle: “Practice Perfects Theory” (Die
praktische Übung krönt das theoretische
Wissen), a motto Czerny’s English translator
found entirely justified in the context of the
treatise’s aim to teach form and genre progres-
sively by example and exercise.
Two decades before Czerny’s treatise ap-
peared, the aspiring pedagogue Johann Bernhard
Logier published a wide-ranging music treatise
in London and Berlin simultaneously. Logier, a
German of French extraction who came to En-
gland via Ireland as a literary and music entre-
preneur, asserted a similar pedagogical outlook
in his dictum that “to acquire facility in com-
position much practice is absolutely neces-
77William Crotch, Elements of Musical Composition (Lon-
don: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brown, 1812), 80,
122–23.
78Czerny, School of Practical Composition, 3 vols. (1849):
I, iii (original emphasis).
Table 1
Publication dates of treatises on composition and harmony
Author Title Translation Date Translator
[Orig. Lang.
Publication]
Johann 1816 [1816] J. B. Logier (?)
Bernhard
Logier
J. B. Logier 1827 [1827] J. B. Logier (?)
Luigi 1837 [1835] J. A. Hamilton
Cherubini
Gottfried 1842 [1817–21, James F.
Weber 1830–32] Warner
Carl Czerny 1848 [1849] John Bishop
A. B. Marx 1852 [1837–38] Augustus
Wehrhan
Anton Reicha 1854 [1816–18] Arnold
Merrick /
John Bishop
Logier’s Theoretical and Practical Study for the
Piano Forte, comprising a Series of Compositions
selected from the most Classical Works ancient
and modern arranged with Inverted and Funda-
mental Basses and fingered throughout: being a
continuation of instruction on his system of
musical education
A System of the Science of Music and Practical
Composition, Incidentally Comprising what is
usually understood by the term thoroughbass
A Course of Counterpoint and Fugue (2 vols.)
An Attempt at a Systematically Arranged
Theory of Musical Composition
School of Practical Composition: or, Complete
Treatise on the Composition of all Kinds of
Music (3 vols.)
The School of Musical Composition, Practical
and Theoretical
Course of Musical Composition: or, Complete
& Methodical Treatise of Practical Harmony
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sary.”79 The treatise’s three parts address piano
technique, harmony and counterpoint, and
methods of instruction. He characterized his
work as “relating solely to Music as a Science,
and the application of that science to practical
composition.”80 Logier was writing for an ama-
teur audience keen to benefit from scientific
knowledge. Protesting at what he saw as the
aesthetic pretentions of originality and inspira-
tion, he asks mockingly:
How shall I begin? How shall I set about it? . . . If the
pupil . . . has carefully studied the construction of
period and melodies, the necessity of asking such
questions no longer exists; for what beginning can
be more simple . . . he draws an outline of his
intended composition, fills it up with fundamental
basses, extracts inverted basses, and constructs a
countermelody; to which he adds the rest of this
parts, dissonances, passing and auxiliary notes etc.
All this is accomplished without difficulty, because
the rules are all determined, and nothing is left to
chance. During this process, no peculiar musical
genius or feeling, no imagination or nicely-discrimi-
nating [sic] musical ear is required. . . . The process
here pointed out is so simple, and, it may be added,
interesting, that it only requires in us the will, and
the object is accomplished.81
His final statement is curiously aligned with
Darwin’s view of phrenology as proof of free
will, but the key point for present purposes is
that Logier’s belief in mechanical repetition of
what amounts to a permutational logic of har-
mony interlocks neatly with the virtual mus-
cular work phrenologists advised for expanding
a mental faculty.
The swagger behind Logier’s claim that me-
chanical, rule-based composition is voided of
genius and hence “guaranteed” was criticized
candidly. A committee of sixteen “professors
in London” complained that after two and a
half years of training, “this boasted System be-
gan and ended by the exhibition of certain com-
binations of chords on a slate. . . . These . . .
have not much more relation to Harmony and
Composition, than Arithmetic has to Poetry.”82
Responding to Logier’s marketing claims, the
committee publicly denounced him in a pam-
phlet, the ensuing exchanges of which were
then collated and republished separately, such
was the public interest.83 The pamphlet contin-
ues that the acquisition of knowledge “must
always be progressive, and is generally slow,”
concluding that it is hardly surprising “that
any system, by which it is pretended that Sci-
ence may be acquired at the expense of little
time, and less labour, should be regarded with
extraordinary suspicion.”84 Such a critical re-
ception of this assembly-line approach to com-
position indicates Logier’s treatise touched a
nerve, even if his transparent advertising un-
dermines any stable interpretation thereof, phre-
nological or otherwise.
In fact, the application of phrenology’s ma-
terialist principles to musical studies arguably
finds its truest expression in Logier’s system-
atic approach to training pianists, and its ob-
lique pedagogical model in England, Joseph
Lancaster’s monitorial system. The one involves
physically playing through exercises on a rigid
mechanical apparatus (“chiroplast”/Handbild-
ner), the other saw school rooms set out mecha-
nistically; both applied principles of system-
atic, efficient, practice-based learning, and both
carry the burden of increasing aptitude by re-
petitive, mechanically guided activity. It is no
coincidence that they were directly compared
in at least one contemporary account,85 and
79J. B. Logier, A System of the Science of Music and Practi-
cal Composition (London: J. Green, 1827), 321 (emphasis
added).
80Ibid., xii.
81Ibid., 321–22, 323 (emphasis added).
82A committee of professors in London, An Exposition of
the Musical System of Mr Logier with Strictures on His
Chiroplast (London: Budd and Calkin, 1818), 66–67. The
authors’ names are given as: “Messrs. Attwood, Ayrton, J.
Beale, F. Cramer, Crotch, Dance, Ferrari, Griffin, Horsley,
C. Knyvett, Latour, Mazzinghi, Neate, Novello, Ries, G.
Smart.”
83Ibid. See the six articles presented chronologically under
the heading: “Mr. Logier’s New System of Musical In-
struction,” Quarterly Musical Magazine and Review 1–4
(1818): 111–40. A summary assessment of the exchange is
given in Bernarr Rainbow, “Johann Bernhard Logier and
the Chiroplast Controversy,” Musical Times 131 (1990):
193–96.
84Various, An Exposition of the Musical System, 3, 67.
85“The advantages and defects of (Logier’s) system were
too much exaggerated and also condemned. The professors
apprehended that it would take their business out of their
hands, and decried it as a piece of imprudent quackery;
but there can be no doubt, as far as the Lancastrian plan is
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while Logier’s apparatus was part of a family of
orthopedic piano devices at the time, he was
unusual in Georgian England for promoting se-
rious instrumental practice, which remained
“fit only for the hired help” in David Golby’s
words, and was seen as a “poor cousin” to the
past glories of Handel’s oratorios.86
To train pianists, Logier’s “chiroplast” regu-
lated finger movement and hand position. It
was patented in 1814 and, as plate 5 shows,
consisted of two parts: parallel horizontal brass
rails above the keyboard effectively fixed the
position of the pianist’s wrists while playing;
and movable brass “finger guides” restricted
finger movement, ensuring only a vertical ac-
tion in any given five-finger position. Teaching
often involved multiple pianists working to-
gether at different pianos simultaneously, the
advantages of which were that “all slight errors
are mutually corrected, [and] the happiest emu-
lation is excited.”87 And, linked to the device, a
“gamut board” placed on the music desk en-
sured that each written note was placed above
its corresponding key.
The stated aim in Logier’s first companion
to the device was “to do that by an infallible
mechanical means, which is now done by a
long process of instruction.”88 If the alleged
objectivity of phrenology was visibly reinforced
in lecture theaters by its scientific accoutre-
ments—skulls, casts, busts, brain charts—the
chiroplast replaced one symbol for objectivity
with another. Principally, the device molded
students’ hands into regulated instruments,
teaching basic tonal theory as corollary; but
the possibility arises that the sensation of
fingerwork may itself induce affective thoughts,
as Blasius has intimated, and Logier explicitly
asserts his chiroplastic exercises will arouse in
students “a desire for composing . . . in the
style of variations . . . whilst they are intended
merely to improve the hand, [they] may also
unconsciously improve the head.”89 This puta-
tive development of compositional skill through
finger activity is effectively a phrenological
statement in this context. Plate 6, from Logier’s
first companion, illustrates the progressive, di-
dactic steps from five-finger exercise to two-
part counterpoint.
Logier actively promoted his device in Ire-
land, France, the German states, and Great Brit-
ain, where he experienced a degree of financial
success but was accused of charlatanism. By
1818 at least one academy for “chiroplastic”
instruction had been established,90 and
Cruikshank, the future satirist of phrenology,
responded with the caricature shown in plate
7. It sides with the accusers in showing Logier
prancing atop a piano, satirizing his method of
teaching piano simultaneously to a group of
“500” children; the text parodies chestnuts of
music theory such as the natural origins of
tonality, the uncertain harmonic basis of the
minor triad, and the avoidance of parallel fifths
and octaves. It also lampoons Londoners who
invested in the method, being dedicated “to all
those double Flats that are not sharp enough to
secure their Notes from being transposed into
the pockets of an ignorant Pretender.”
Things fared better on the continent. Fol-
lowing Louis Spohr’s 1820 endorsement of the
London “chiroplastic” academy in the Berlin
Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung, the Prus-
sian government endorsed the machine in 1821
when funds were created to set up several such
academies. A. B. Marx was quick to give a
patriotic stamp of approval: “So in Germany
[Logier’s method] received its scientific accep-
tance and basis, its general adoption in the
science of sound.”91 On this basis, Myles Jack-
pursued in teaching a number (of day school pupils) to-
gether, that the same principle may be applied to music
with advantage.” In William Gardiner, Music and Friends:
or, Pleasant Recollections of a Dilettante, 2 vols. (London:
Longman, Orme, Brown, and Longman, 1838), II, 649.
86David J. Golby, Instrumental Teaching in Nineteenth-
Century Britain (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005), 66. For a dis-
cussion of early-nineteenth-century orthopedic devices for
training pianists, see Davies, Romantic Anatomies of Per-
formance, 109–15, 156–60.
87J. B. Logier, Sequel to the First Companion to the
Chiroplast (London: J. Green, 1827), 2 (emphasis added).
88J. B. Logier, The First Companion to the Royal Patent
Chiroplast, 5th edn. (London: I. Green, 1822), unnumbered
dedication page.
89Ibid., 8.
90Samuel Webbe’s academy was located at 20 Bedford Place,
Russell Square. See various, An Exposition of the Musical
System of Mr Logier, iii.
91A. B. Marx, “Zusatz aus andrer Feder,” Berliner allge-
meine musikalische Zeitung 2 (1825): 58–60, 65–67, 73–
75, here 60.
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Plate 5: An engraving of J. B. Logier’s Chiroplast, given in his
First Companion to the Royal Patent Chiroplast (London: I. Green, 1819).
Credit: Eda Kuhn Loeb Music Library of the Harvard Library.
119
DAVID
TRIPPETT
Phrenology
and Music
Plate 6: Lessons V–VIII from Logier’s First Companion to the Royal
Patent Chiroplast (London: I. Green, 1819), 18–20.
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Plate 7: George Cruikshank caricature of Logier, entitled
“A German mountebank blowing his own trumpet at a Dutch concert
of 500 piano fortes!!” (1 April 1818). Credit: British Museum 1865, 1111.2093.
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son aptly concludes that “musicians used ma-
chines and mechanical principles to teach the
skills normally taught by masters, and . . .
some musicians, rather controversially, saw
physicists as possible allies in pedagogical mat-
ters.”92 Beyond the executive practices Jackson
illuminates, this principle plausibly extends to
understandings of compositional pedagogy, as
we saw in Czerny’s progressive working through
musical forms, and Logier’s program for collec-
tive, virtual labor in harmony and counterpoint.
The broader principle of collective, mechani-
cal exercising of faculties was applied in mac-
rocosm to English education through the so-
called monitorial system. Lancaster’s Improve-
ments in Education (1803) cites London schools
as a social problem for which the solution was
a rigorous system of peer monitoring. This prin-
ciple saw between 200 and 1,000 children sit-
ting in rows in a single room; an adult school-
master teaches the monitors (prefects), each of
whom relays the lesson mechanically to his or
her row, pupil by pupil, like a marble setting
other marbles in motion, one by one. Monitors
also take attendance, promote pupils, and pre-
pare teaching resources. Discipline was harshly
enforced, schools were single-sex, and a guid-
ing principle was that all children must be oc-
cupied with tasks at all times to avoid “dis-
gusting scenes of noise and riot.”93 The aspira-
tions behind this mechanical multiplication of
learning is illustrated in Lancaster’s sample es-
timate of what his school could achieve and
how he would measure it:
Each boy can spell 100 words in a morning: if 100
scholars do this 200 mornings yearly, the following
will be the total of their efforts towards improve-
ment:
100 words
200 mornings
20,000 words each boy per ann. 100 boys
2,000,000 total words spelt by 100 boys, per ann.
The repetition of the same word many times serves
to rivet it firmly in the memory, and thus produces
92Myles W. Jackson, “Physics, Machines and Musical Peda-
gogy in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” History of Sci-
ence 42 (2004): 371–418, here 374.
93Joseph Lancaster, Improvements in Education as it Re-
spects the Industrious Classes of the Community (Lon-
don: Darton and Harvey, 1803), 7.
the total; for the intelligent reader will readily per-
ceive, that the same trouble will occur in teaching
1,000 words distinctly, twenty times over, as would
happen in teaching 2,000 distinct words, containing
an equal number of syllables, only once over. I have
avoided exaggeration in the above statement.94
Such quantitative bliss was not widely shared.
While cost-efficient nonsectarian education for
the working classes formed an important social
goal, the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1911
summed up criticism of the monitorial system:
as a reduction of the schoolmaster to a by-
stander; of learning to drill and memorization;
and of the curriculum to particles of informa-
tion and rote sequences.95 Perhaps the most
critical judgment against the system is not its
method but its failure to live up to its promise
for efficiency. While figures of high authority
may have instilled respectful behavior, con-
temporary reports to the House of Commons
also indicate how discipline could fail.96
Reactionary critics voiced concern over the
seeming mechanization of education through
such systems and devices, as well as the loss of
organic life they appeared to represent. Gottfried
Weber, for one, was explicitly skeptical of sys-
tematic training in music and implicitly at-
tacked Logier’s sales pitch to amateurs (that
“their more limited object can be attained by a
correspondingly shorter route”):
musical art is not susceptible of such a systematic
establishment, or at least . . . it has thus far failed of
proving itself to be so. The little truth which we
have as yet discovered in the realm of musical com-
position, consists merely in a number of experiments
94Ibid., 59–60.
95J. G. F., “Joseph Lancaster,” Encyclopaedia Britannica;
see https://archive.org/stream/encyclopaediabri16chisrich#
page/148/mode/2up/search/lancaster%2C+joseph [accessed
16 September 2014].
96The following are observations on a girls’ monitorial
school in Birmingham: “thirty-one girls read Marx xii. to
their monitor. The noise in the school was so great that as
I sat by the monitor I could not hear the girl who was
reading in the class. Several children were laughing to
each other, others were inattentive; and the only symp-
tom of reverence in the whole class was, that every time
the name of our Lord was pronounced the whole class
made a short rapid curtsey. . . . The mistress was occupied
in another part of the school.” In Minutes of the Commit-
tee of Council on Education, 1840–41 (London: William
Clowes, 1841), 185.
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and observations upon the good or bad effect of this
or that combination of tones. But an attempt to
derive these facts of experience, in a logically con-
secutive manner, from any one leading principle and
to reduce them to the form of a philosophical sci-
ence—to a system, has always thus far . . . been
destined only to a signal defeat.97
In less measured tones, Thomas Carlyle eyed
the social effects of such applied learning, fa-
mously stating that “not the external and physi-
cal alone is now managed by machinery, but
the internal and spiritual also. . . . We have
machines for education: Lancastrian machines;
Hamiltonian machines; monitors, maps and em-
blems.”98 This kind of criticism gave voice to a
particular anxiety about the industrial cityscape
and increasing mechanization of natural phi-
losophies of mind within Victorian society,
what Simon Schaffer has called “the mundane
places of intelligence.”99 As plate 8 shows, it
too provided a platform for satirists. Carica-
tures by Robert Seymour, William Heath, Tho-
mas McLean, and others depicted a “march of
intellect” in England that was upending soci-
ety through mass education technologies, end-
ing what Carlyle called “the old natural meth-
ods.”100
The implied outcome for music, as depicted
here, is to replace casual buskers with a plumed
opera diva, a concert harpist, and Vaucanson’s
mechanical flute player (1737), imagining a shift
on London streets from unpretentious popular
tunes to composed arias, and from ill-educated,
poverty-stricken performers to intricate au-
tomata. Even an erstwhile street hustler is en-
visioned as Wolfgang von Kempelen’s “Me-
chanical Turk” (1770), a world-class chess-play-
ing machine that captivated the European imagi-
nation before being revealed as a hoax conceal-
ing a human within.101 The image registers fear
of change: an anxiety toward modern educa-
tion and technologies of imagined social trans-
formation. Gas street lamps burn anthropomor-
phically like a small sun, balloon travel domi-
nates the skyline (implicitly replacing sea travel,
as ships adopt the technology), steam-powered
cars pepper the ground, just as a newspaper-
reading coach driver and fruit seller learn about
the world as a result of the new steam-powered
printing press, which brought with it the mass
availability of information.
A preexisting continuity is manifest between
phrenological principles of exercise—typified
in Simpson’s law of efficiency common to “the
blacksmith’s right arm and . . . the philosopher’s
brain”—and the principles of training embod-
ied in Logier’s repetitive methods and Czerny’s
practical school. It makes the case for under-
standing phrenology as a “manifest discourse”
in Foucault’s sense: that which is “really no
more than the repressive presence of what it
does not say.”102 Nauenburg and Berlioz alone
among professional musicians made bold state-
ments about phrenology’s necessary relation to
music (against the anxieties of social change
that shadowed it). Far more traceable, for a
history written according to documents, is the
inexhaustible speech of amateurs who wanted
to believe the promise of mechanized mental
exercise as a guarantor of self-betterment.
In London, Charles Babbage’s principle of
automated reason, embodied in the 1822 pro-
posal for a difference engine, is a touchstone in
reinforcing the degree to which mental and
mechanical interpenetrate: “the analogy be-
tween [mechanical] acts and the operations of
the mind,” he admitted, “almost forced upon
me the figurative employment of the same
terms.”103 Logier’s attempt to mechanize piano
97Gottfried Weber, An Attempt at a Systematically Ar-
ranged Theory of Musical Composition (Boston: Wilkins
& R.B. Carter, 1842), 6.
98Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” The Oxford Book
of Essays, ed. John Gross (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), 137 (emphasis added).
99Simon Schaffer, “Babbage’s Intelligence: Calculating En-
gines and the Factory System,” Critical Inquiry 21 (1994):
203–27, here 204.
100Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” 137.
101See Simon Schaffer, “Enlightened Automata,” The Sci-
ences in Enlightened Europe, ed. William Clark, Jan
Golinski, and Simon Schaffer (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1999), 126–65.
102Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and
the Discourse of Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith
(New York: Vintage, 2010), 25.
103Charles Babbage, “On the Mathematical Powers of the
Calculating Engine,” in The Works of Charles Babbage,
ed. Martin Campbell-Kelly, 3 vols. (New York: New York
University Press, 1989), III, 31.
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instruction tapped into the equally mirrored
emblems of the piano as a cognitive machine
and the mind as a mechanical piano. Later in
the century the logician Stanley Jevons (1835–
82) pursued mathematical approaches to eco-
nomics while at University College London as
part of his broader investigation in the laws of
thought. Convinced that a system could be au-
tomated so that the logical consequences of
known states of affairs could be generated effi-
ciently, he was led to the design of a “logical
piano . . . capable of replacing for the most part
the action of thought required in the perfor-
mance of logical deduction.”104
Herbert Spencer, like Descartes before him,
interpreted the brain through the paradigm of
the piano on several occasions.105 Such a con-
ceit relies on the assumption of the mind’s
objective presence; in Combe’s words, that the
“mind in the abstract has no existence.”106 With
materialist relish, Spencer would build on the
platform set out by Simpson—again, mention-
ing neither phrenology nor Spurzheim (from
whom, indirectly, the principle originates)—to
emphasize the necessary physicality of culti-
vating one’s “brain organs” and the social im-
perative of attending to what he called one’s
physical conscience: “the fact seems strange
that while the raising of first-rate bullocks is
104Stanley Jevons, “On the Mechanical Performance of Logi-
cal Inference,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society 160 (1870): 497–518, here 517.
105Spencer’s arguments appear in Principles of Psychology
(London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1855).
For an overview, see C. U. M. Smith, “Evolution and the
Problem of Mind: Part 1,” Journal of the History of Biol-
ogy 15 (1982): 55–88.
106Combe, A System of Phrenology, 5th edn., 2 vols. (Lon-
don: Longman, 1843), II, 407.
Plate 8: William Heath/ Paul Pry, “A Futuristic Vision: technology is over-sophisticated,
and the masses devote themselves to intellectual pursuits, while the basic needs of society
are neglected,” Color etching, 23 January 1828. Credit: Welcome Library, London.
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an occupation on which educated men will-
ingly bestow much time and thought, the bring-
ing up of fine human beings is an occupation
tacitly unworthy of their attention.” He
quipped, “we see infinite pains taken to pro-
duce a racer that shall win the Derby: none to
produce a modern athlete”; or a modern musi-
cian, we might add (holding in abeyance the
above reading of Czerny and Logier).107
Ultimately, the emphasis on materialism in
the service of artistic education marks an atti-
tude that saw the basic divide weaken between
an aesthetics of metaphysical prime causes and
one of empirical, progressive science. While
such a rapprochement was not uncontested in
the mid-nineteenth century, it speaks to an age
quite different from C. P. Snow’s “two cul-
tures” a century later, whose tacit call for uni-
fication was famously eviscerated by F. R. Leavis
as “portentously ignorant. . . . [Snow] is intel-
lectually as undistinguished as it is possible to
be.”108 However distorting it proved, the per-
spective of phrenology subsumed this caustic
divide. And however casuistic its reasoning,
and deceptive its demonstrations, its discourse
highlights a widespread belief in the methodi-
cal means of cultivating intellectual skill, which
must include musical skill. Such a belief is
summarized in Spurzheim’s assertion that hu-
man nature “is susceptible of perfection or deg-
radation,” a condition that justified for him
monitorial education as principally a system of
“continued exercise.”109 The extent to which
figures like Logier, Czerny, and Weber under-
stood composition and performance as perfect-
ible activities in this sense remains an open
question. To return one last time to Nauenburg:
“Since we troubled ourselves to lower our art
to physiological and psychological foundations,”
he demurs, “it entered into the ranks of the
modern perfectible sciences.”110 With such
strained irony, few statements could better sum-
marize the ambivalence of music’s status
in an age of phrenological science.
Abstract.
The icon of the machine in early-nineteenth-cen-
tury Britain was subject to a number of contempo-
rary critiques in which pedagogy and the life of the
mind were implicated, but to what extent was edu-
cation in music composition influenced by this? A
number of journal articles appeared on the topic of
music and phrenology, bolstered by the establish-
ment of the London Phrenological Society (1823),
and its sister organization, the British Phrenological
Association (1838). They placed the creative imagi-
nation, music, and the “natural” life of the mind
into a fraught discourse around music and material-
ism. The cost of a material mind was a perceived
loss of contact with the “gifts of naturer . . . the
dynamical nature of man . . . the mystic depths of
man’s soul” (Carlyle), but the concept of machine
was also invested with magical potential to trans-
form matter, to generate energy, and can be under-
stood as a new ideal type of mechanism. These
confliciting ideals and anxieties over mechanism, as
paradigm and rallying cry, are here situated in the
context of music pedagogy during the second quar-
ter of the century, with particular reference to ama-
teur musicians and the popular appeal of phrenologi-
cal “exercise,” and of devices such as Johann Bernhard
Logier’s “chiroplast.” Keywords: phrenology, chiro-
plast, Johann Bernhard Logier, materialism, machine,
music pedagogy
107Herbert Spencer, Education: Intellectual, Moral, and
Physical (London: G. Manwaring, 1861), 146.
108F. R. Leavis, Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P.
Snow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53–
54.
109Spurzheim, A View of the Elementary Principles of Edu-
cation, 2, 136.
110“Seitdem wir unsere Kunst auf physiologische und
psychologische Basis zu reduciren bemüht sind, tritt sie in
die Reihe der modernen Perkectibilitätswissenschaften.”
Nauenburg, “Die Phrenologie in ihrer Beziehung zur
Tonkunst,” Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 2 (1851): 13 (em-
phasis added).
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